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The Crisis in Productivity 
FOUR WAYS TO MAKE CITIES MORE EFFICIENT 
by E. S. SAVAS/Graduate School of Business, C o l u m b i a Univers i ty 
Government is big business in the United States. There 
are almost 80,000 separate government entities in the 
country, and together they collect taxes which amount to 
one-third of the gross national product. The average 
work ing American can be thought of as working full t ime 
for the government from January 1 to May 2 this year; 
only thereafter wil l he get to keep his earnings. 
Contrary to popular impression, most of the money 
spent by government for goods and services is spent by 
state and local governments, not by the federal govern-
ment. The former spent $170 bil l ion in 1973, compared to 
$107 bi l l ion spent by the federal government. 
State and local government employees number 11.5 
mi l l ion, about one-seventh of the civilian work force, and 
the annual growth of this work force in recent years has 
been greater than the total employed in the steel 
industry. In fact, between 1955 and 1970 their number 
doubled and the payroll more than tr ipled. 
Given this growing number of public employees and 
the taxes used to support their work, it is no wonder that 
productivity has emerged as a dominant problem in man-
aging our cities. Particularly vulnerable to charges of 
being inefficient are local governments, since they are in 
the unenviable position of being responsible for daily de-
livery of highly visible services. The disparity between 
input and output looms large in the public eye. 
Faced wi th this pressure, local governments are begin-
ning to apply traditional methods for increasing produc-
tivity—capital investment in technology, more training, 
and " t ighter management." Such newer tools as systems 
analysis, management science, and computers are also 
being introduced, sometimes over-enthusiastically, some-
times belatedly, but increasingly wi th discrimination and 
sophistication. Local governments may be five to 10 years 
behind industry leaders in the application of these tech-
niques, but the gap is closing as the public sector begins 
to compete effectively wi th the private sector for talent. 
However, experienced and frustrated public-sector 
managers no longer believe, if they ever d id , that the 
major obstacles to improved performance in govern-
ment are going to be overcome by technology alone. In 
fact, it is becoming increasingly clear that a significant 
and permanent increase in government efficiency is 
going to be achieved only by recognizing the institu-
tional nature of the obstacles, designing a management 
strategy to overcome them, and bui lding the political 
support to do so. 
Four major problems deserve our attention: (1) mea-
suring performance; (2) municipal monopolies; (3) civil 
service reform; and (4) the government structure. 
Measuring Performance 
The basic difficulty is that the result of a government 
agency's effort is hard to measure. The business f i rm uses 
profi t as the ultimate measure of performance, and a 
salesman prospers or fails according to his sales record. 
But how does one measure the performance of a school 
system, or of an individual teacher? How can one mea-
sure the performance of a parks department? 
Because of the diff iculty in identifying and measuring 
output, the typical numbers issued by governments refer 
to input. In effect, one hears a dialogue of the deaf: 
Citizen: There is too much crime in this city. 
City Official: You're right, we plan to increase the 
police department budget by 15 percent. 
But such a response is no measure of how effective the 
city wil l be in f ighting crime. What it does have is the po-
litical virtue of visibility and immediacy. It tangibly 
demonstrates official concern for the issue. But it signals 
intent, not achievement. Furthermore, if the 15 percent 
increase is spent on higher salaries for pol icemen, it is 
unl ikely—with all due respect for the men in blue and 
their sometimes hazardous occupation—that the force 
wil l be more successful in deterring crime or catching 
criminals. Even if the money goes for more pol icemen, 
the gesture may be useless if the present force is doing a 
good job of catching criminals but the courts fail to 
convict them or the prisons fail to rehabilitate them. 
The problem of measuring output (either performance 
or effectiveness) is now finally being addressed. One 
example is street-cleaning agencies. Trained observers, 
each armed with a standard set of photographs depicting 
different levels of street cleanliness, have gone out and 
inspected city streets, grading them in accordance with 
their photographic scale. 
Performance measures for other city agencies are also 
being developed. For police work, the "vict imizat ion 
rate" has emerged as a useful measure. In a statistical 
sample of citizen interviews, people are asked if they 
have been the victim of a recent crime. This method 
appears superior to the " repor ted crime rate," which is 
generally lower, is subject to official distort ion, and may 
vary according to the expectation or apathy that the 
public feels toward its police force. 
In short, the emphasis is on measuring government 
productivity. And it is likely that the process of measuring 
it wi l l create the impetus to improve it. 
Municipal Monopolies 
A city is uniquely vulnerable to strikes and slowdowns. It 
does not have the options of moving to the South, 
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starting a branch in Hong Kong, or going out of busi-
ness. It is vulnerable because one of its principal func-
tions is to provide, or at least regulate, services that by 
their very nature are monopolies. Thus, cities furnish 
public sanitation, police, and fire services; whi le state 
governments regulate the private power and telephone 
companies. These are all monopolies of a crucial sort, for 
their services cannot be stockpiled or imported. 
Therein lies a key problem in the productivity of city 
governments. Monopol ies, whether public or private, 
tend to become inefficient. Since most city agencies are 
monopolies, their staffs are automatically tempted to 
exercise that monopoly power for their own parochial 
advantage—and efficiency is rarely seen as an advantage. 
In other words, the inefficiency of municipal services is 
not due to bad mayors, commissioners, managers, 
workers, or unions. It is a natural consequence of a 
monopoly system. The public created the monopoly, the 
monopoly behaves in predictable fashion, and there are 
no culprits, only scapegoats. 
Evidence of malfunctioning municipal monopolies and 
low productivity is distressingly easy to f ind. For ex-
ample, the mayor's office in New York City was con-
cerned about the performance of its sanitation depart-
ment, which enjoys a monopoly in the collection of 
residential refuse. The efficiency of the department was 
compared to that of the private refuse collection indus-
try, and was found to be only one third as great. 
The explanation for the threefold difference in costs is 
rooted in such embarrassingly old-fashioned concepts as 
close supervision, good direct ion, and the profit motive. 
The more refuse a private hauler picks up in a day, the 
more money he makes. In the municipal monopoly, 
there is no connection between the two. 
A brief glimpse at cities under other economic systems 
is intr iguing. In socialist Belgrade, refuse collection is 
contracted out to private-sector cooperatives. In com-
munist Moscow, collection workers are paid on an in-
centive system according to their productivity. Whereas 
in New York City—the bastion of capitalism—Wall Street 
itself is cleaned by a socialist-style bureaucracy in which 
there is no relation between performance and reward. 
There is no compell ing reason why refuse-collection 
service must be provided under monopolistic condi-
tions. A city government can contract wi th one or more 
private firms to perform this work. If a city is too large for 
a single f i rm, the city can be divided into sections, each 
one to be "auct ioned of f" to the low bidder. 
But if what is called for is competi t ion rather than a 
monopoly, this does not necessarily mean that the private 
sector rather than the public sector should do the work. 
There are many places where private collection service is 
a monopoly, or at best a collusive ol igopoly—a situation 
hardly in the public interest. In such cases, competi t ion 
can be spurred by government entry into the business. 
Why, in fact, does not every city examine carefully the 
services it provides, in order to determine whether or not 
competi t ion wil l provide more cost-effective service to 
local taxpayers? For example, certain kinds of street-
repair work lend themselves to "contract ing out . " In 
Montreal , snow removal is performed by this method. 
The benefits of competi t ion may also be enjoyed when 
interagency competi t ion is organized wi th in the local 
government or even between governments. 
Parking enforcement illustrates this point. Some cities 
have parking enforcement agents in a department other 
than the police department. If both departments issue 
summonses for the same kinds of violations, then a sys-
tematic comparison of their relative productivity and 
cost-effectiveness can serve to improve the performance 
of both agencies. 
The delivery of a public service is likely to be 
most efficient if that service is offered in a com-
petitive market situation, whether the provider is 
a public agency or a private firm. 
Unfortunately, so-called experts in public administra-
t ion often devote their energies to reducing and el im-
inating competi t ion among government units, on the er-
roneous assumption that such competi t ion is a wasteful 
duplication of effort. 
A refreshing and thought-provoking example of del ib-
erately inspired governmental competi t ion comes f rom 
Ljubljana, in Yugoslavia. The city fathers there required 
the services of city planners in connection wi th a par-
ticular project, and solicited formal bids for the work not 
only f rom the city planning agency of Ljubljana but also 
f rom the city planning agency of Zagreb, a rival city. An 
American observer remarked in awe that he had never 
seen city employees anywhere work as hard as Ljubljana's 
city planners, who were feverishly trying to avoid the 
humil iat ion of losing their own city's work to their pro-
fessional rivals. 
As a final illustration of the virtues of compet i t ion, a 
number of cities in southern California have created a 
market environment by purchasing services f rom the 
county, f rom each other, f rom specially created districts, 
f rom the private sector, and by providing services 
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through their o w n work forces. At one point in time, for 
example, there were 1,437 separate contracts, cover ing 55 
different services, in effect between 74 purchasing cities 
and 21 producers compris ing 16 departments of Los 
Ange les C o u n t y and five special service districts. T h e 
existence of these compet ing alternatives has had a salu-
tary effect on the management and delivery of such 
services. 
In summary, the delivery of a publ ic service is likely to 
be most efficient if that service is offered in a competi -
tive market situation, whether the provider is a publ ic 
agency or a private firm. Both quality and cost will suffer 
if the prov ider—publ ic or private—has, in effect, a 
monopoly . 
Civi l Service Reform 
The nation's basic civil service law was written in 1883, 
fol lowing the assassination of President Garf ield by a dis-
gruntled job seeker. T h e goal of the law was both noble 
and necessary: to assure that the merit principle, rather 
than the patronage principle, w o u l d be used for the se-
lection and promot ion of federal employees. Subse-
quently, in reaction to the excesses of the spoils system 
which had prevailed for the preceding half century, a 
civil service reform movement swept the entire country. 
In trying to insure against the wrong things in publ ic 
employment—nepot ism, patronage, prejudice, favorit-
ism, corrupt ion—the civil service system has today been 
warped and distorted to the point where it can do hardly 
anything at all. In order to protect itself against past 
abuses, the "merit system'' has often been perverted and 
transformed into a c losed and meritless system. 
After more than 90 years, the stage is set, in my 
opin ion, for civil service reform. A true merit system must 
be constructed, one that provides the opportunity for any 
qual if ied cit izen to enter the publ ic service non-pol it i -
cally, to be recogn ized and rewarded for g o o d perfor-
mance, and even to face the possibility of being re-
placed for unsatisfactory service. Productivity will remain 
a quixot ic effort unless this fundamental of publ ic per-
sonnel management is addressed. 
Government Structure 
The problems of management and productivity in A m e r -
ican cities derive, in part, f rom a fundamental mismatch 
between the responsibil ity and the authority of local 
Five Soviet special-
ists are given tour of 
mass transit facili-
ties in Los Angeles. 












What d o the management of city 
problems in the Soviet Union and in 
the United States have in common? A 
program is underway to explore this 
quest ion jointly. Under an A m e r -
ican-Soviet agreement for scientific 
and technical cooperat ion s igned in 
1972, one topic of c o m m o n interest is 
the use of computers in the manage-
ment of large cities. M o r e specif ic-
ally, it is the development of urban 
management information systems 
concern ing mass transit, the move-
ment of goods within cities, and the 
governments. Contr ibut ing to the mismatch is the gross in-
congruity between the natural geographic boundaries of 
an urban funct ion and the legal boundaries of the political 
jurisdiction nominally charged with attending to that func-
t ion. For example, air pol lut ion as a problem transcends the 
boundaries of the central city; yet the municipal govern-
ment is l imited in its ability to address the problem. It can-
not, for example, prevent pol luted air f rom wafting in f rom 
a neighboring area, nor curtail automobile use to an extent 
that it wil l have an impact on the transportation system and 
economy of the entire metropoli tan complex. 
It is necessary to re-examine local government services in 
metropol i tan areas and to sort them out. Which level of 
government should provide which services to whom, and 
how should those services be paid for? The gradual, evolu-
tionary process of addressing this question is underway, 
and involves revenue sharing, regionalism, and neighbor-
hood government. The poverty/welfare problem, it seems, 
is best handled at the national level, whi le transportation, 
pol lut ion, water supply, and waste disposal are clearly re-
gional issues. On the other hand, street cleaning, street 
repair, and refuse collection have primarily a local impact 
and can be handled at that level. 
In my opin ion, it is necessary to restructure local govern-
ments in order to produce a better match between func-
tional responsibility and effective authority. Present 
boundary lines are largely the result of historical happen-
stance. New tiers of government, regional and local, are 
needed to replace the obsolete levels still existing in urban 
areas. England is well along in such reforms and some 
American cities—including Indianapolis, Jacksonville, 
Nashville, and Oklahoma City—have begun to move in this 
direction also. 
Summary 
A fundamental improvement in the productivity of local 
government wil l require far-reaching institutional changes 
based on sound management principles. Great political 
effort wi l l be needed to make these changes: to introduce 
non-partisan performance measurement, to break up the 
municipal monopolies and provide competi t ion in the de-
livery of services, to restore merit to the civil service system, 
and to restructure governments in our metropoli tan areas. 
But these changes are necessary if the consumers of public 
services are to receive better value for the taxes they pay. £ 
basic organization and performance 
of what are known as municipal 
services. 
Four cities, New York, Moscow, Los 
Angeles, and Leningrad, are formally 
involved in the program, but the re-
sults should be of value to many cities 
in each country. Automobi le-
clogged American cities, for ex-
ample, can benefit by learning more 
about how the movement of trucks is 
control led in Moscow. In addit ion, 
impressive mass transit systems in 
large Soviet cities can offer lessons to 
American cities which are emerging 
f rom the age of the auto and are plan-
ning a more balanced and flexible 
transportation mix. O n the other 
hand, Soviet cities can learn a great 
deal f rom U.S. cities' computer-based 
managerial systems. To a much 
greater extent than in the Soviet 
Un ion, American cities have re-
solved the issues of which systems to 
bui ld , how to design them, how to get 
them accepted and uti l ized, and how 
to assess their performance. 
The American port ion of the 
program is supported by the Na-
tional Science Foundation. The pro-
gram does not involve exchange of 
computer hardware or software. 
Rather, it is a more basic exchange of 
knowledge, beginning with how the 
different participating city govern-
ments are organized, what functions 
they perform, and how the latter are 
carried out. 
In 1973, a group of seven Amer-
icans, including the author, visited 
the Soviet Union in connection wi th 
this project and spent many hours 
wi th officials and computer special-
ists in Moscow, Leningrad, Kiev, and 
Novosibirsk. Computer use reflects 
local problems, and the number one 
priority in these cities is housing con-
struction. One manifestation of this is 
that two of the mayors had formerly 
headed the large-scale housing con-
struction programs in their cities. 
(Perhaps the American equivalent is 
the election of mayors wi th police 
experience in Philadelphia, Los 
Angeles, and Minneapolis, and 
mayors with fiscal experience in New 
York and St. Louis.) 
In December, 1974, a team of five 
Soviet specialists, headed by the d i -
rector of Moscow's main computer 
center, spent two weeks visiting mu-
nicipal data processing centers and 
mass transit facilities in New York, Los 
Angeles, and San Francisco. At this 
wr i t ing, a group of American trans-
portation experts is on its way to the 
Soviet Union for the next stage of the 
program. The results of the ex-
change are awaited wi th interest. 
